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COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE IN THE REAL PROPERTY CONTEXT:
AN UPDATE
by Lynda Butler" and Matthew Klepper""
Covenants which restrict the use of land for the purpose of protecting against competition
have been consistently enforced by Virginia courts so long as the covenants are reasonable, not
contrary to public policy, not in restraint of trade and not for the purpose of creating a
monopoly.1 Restrictive covenants of any type are strictly construed due to the strong policy
reasons supporting the unrestricted use of land. 2 Drafting an enforceable restrictive covenant is
generally of little value, however, unless the covenant can be enforced against subsequent
purchasers of the property. Although Virginia courts traditionally have refused to enforce
noncompetition covenants as real covenants against successors to the burdened land by a
judgment for damages at law/ the courts have allowed enforcement by injunction in equity
under the doctrine of equitable servitudes."
The doctrine of equitable servitudes was first described in the famous English case of Tulk
v. Moxhay.s In that case the court ruled that equity would enforce an agreement to use or
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O°Mr. Klepper is a student at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary, in
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IHercules Powder Co. v. Continental Can Co., 196 Va. 935, 939 (1955) (covenant not to engage in
manufacture of pulp on conveyed property upheld in equity).
2Foods First, Inc. v. Gables Associates, 244 Va. 180 (1992) (restrictive covenant prevented lessor from
erecting supermarket larger than lessee's).
3REsrATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 3.6 emt. a (Tentative Draft No.2, 1991). The
courts apparently reasoned that covenants not to compete could not meet the touch and concern
requirement. See, e.g., Tardy v. Creasy, 81 Va. 553 (1886) (building restriction held not to run with the
land because the benefit did not touch and concern). A restrictive covenant runs with the land--and
therefore benefits or burdens a subsequent owner of the land--when the covenant involves an enforceable
promise, the parties intend for the covenant to run and bind successors in interest, the covenant touches
and concerns the land, and privity of estate exists between the covenanting parties. See Net Realty
Holding Trust v. Franconia Properties, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 759, 762 (E.D. Va. 1982). See generally 20 AM.
lUR. 2D Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions § 1, 2 (1982); 21 CJ.S. Covenants § 25 (1990).
4 See, e.g., Carneal v. Kendig, 196 Va. 605 (1955) (covenant not to use land as a movie theater upheld
in equity).

~ Phil. 774 (ell. 1848).
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abstain from using land in a particular way or manner against any purchaser or possessor with
notice regardless of whether the agreement created a valid covenant running with the land at law.
Early on, the Virginia courts applied the doctrine of equitable servitudes to noncompetition
agreements, enforcing the burden6 of competition restrictions in equity against aU purchasers
with notice.' In Oliver v. Hewitt,8 the court upheld a covenant restricting the sale of groceries
and soft drinks on conveyed land and cited with approval the doctrine of Tulk v. Moxhay. The
earlier holding of the court in Tardy v. Creasy, 9 which exemplified the traditional disfavor of
noncompetition covenants in the law, was distinguished by an exceptionally narrow reading.
Relief was denied in Tardy, according to the court in Oliver, "primarily upon the ground that the
restrictive covenant was illegal and unenforceable because it constituted a general restraint of
trade." lO
The most troubling question about noncompetition coven~ts facing Virginia courts during
the first part of this century was whether the benefit of a competition" restriction could be
enforced in equity by a subsequent purchaser. l1 The Virginia Supreme Court, in Hercules
Powder Co. v. Continental Can CO.,12 held that the benefit may pass to subsequent purchasers
when there is proof that the parties intended the benefit to attach to the land in equity. The
Hercules court articulated a standard for when the benefit would pass to successors in interest
which revolved solely around intent: 'llthe intention of the parties [is] the "criterion of the
existence of the right. .. .'"13 This standard was important because it failed to mention the
touch and concern requirement that was a traditional element of both real covenants and equitable
servitudes. Although the touch and concern requirement presented a serious obstacle to

'The promisee's rights and entitlements are known as the "benefit," while the promisor's duties are
known as the "burden." See RICHARD POWEu., nIB l...Aw OF REAL PROPERTY § 673[2] n.3O (P. Rohan
rev. ed. 199O).
Oliver v. Hewitt, 191 Va. 163 (1950) (covenant not to sell groceries on conveyed land enforced
in equity).
7 See

8Id.

981 Va. 553 (1886).
10

Oliver v. Hewitt, 191 Va. at 169-70 (quoting Tardy v. Creasy, 81 Va. at 561-62 (1886».

11

J.S.W., Jr., Private Land Use Restrictions in Virginia, 49 VA. L REv. 1047, 1065 (1963).

12

196 Va. 935 (1955).

13

Id. at 947 (quoting Clleatham v. Taylor, 148 Va. 26, 39 (1927».
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enforcement of noncompetition covenants at law,I4 the requirement was generally of little
consequence in equitable servitude cases. IS As one commentator explained,
Equitable servitudes invariably involve negative covenants-promises with
respect to how land should not be used. Such promises clearly do touch
and concern the land, so the courts of equity, for the most part, have not
stated nor found it necessary to state touch and concern as a separate
requirement.16
Virginia courts appear to have ignored the touch and concern requirement in evaluating the
enforceability of noncompetition covenants in equity, and seem to have followed the suggestion
of many commentators I7 to focus squarely on the public policy issues involved. IS Focusing
on the public policy issues allows the courts to avoid artificial manipulations of the already
difficult touch and concern test and thus minimizes further frustration of the expectations of
lawyers and their clients.
In evaluating noncompetition clauses in the real covenant context, at least one court has
substituted a "reasonableness" test for the traditional touch and concern requirement as its pivotal
inquiry.I9 The court in Davidson Bros., Inc. v. D. Katz & Sons, Inc. explained that courts today
recognize that "parties in commercial-property transactions" may need "to protect themselves
from competition by executing noncompetition covenants,,;20 without the covenants, the parties
may hesitate to invest substantial sums in the property. "A 'reasonableness' test allows a court
to consider the enforceability of a covenant in view of the realities of today's commercial world
and not in the light of out-moded theories developed in a vastly different commercial
environment. ,,21

U·

.

See DaVidson Bros., Inc. v. D. Katz & Sons, Inc., 579 A.2d 288, 292-93 (1990).

IS

See, e.g., Mid-State Equipment Co., Inc. v. Bell, 217 Va. 133, 141 (1976).

Lawrence Berger, Integration of the Law of Easements, Real Covenants and Equitable Servitudes,
43 WASH. & LEE L REv. 337, 362 (1986).
16

17 See, e.g., GERAlD KORNGOLD, PRIVATE l....AND USE ARRANGEMENTS 315-16 (1990); Paula A.
Franzese, flOut of Touch:" The Diminished Viability of the Touch and Concern Requirement in the Law
of Servitudes, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 235, 243 (1991).
18

See Carneal v. Kendig, 196 Va. 605 (1955).

19

Davidson Bros., Inc. v. D. Katz & Sons, Inc., 579 A.2d 288, 292-93 (1990).

20

Id. at 295.
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In defining its reasonableness test, the court in Davidson borrowed from an analogous
standard used to determine the validity of employment noncompetition covenants. This standard
allows enforcement of an employee noncompetition covenant if it "protects the legitimate interest
of the employer" without imposing "undue hardship" on the employee and "is not injurious to
the public."22 Touch and concern considerations played only a mall role in the court's
development of "reasonableness" factors.23 According to the court, "[a]spects of the 'touch and
concern' test. .. remain useful in evaluating the reasonableness of a covenant" by helping to
distinguish between promises that were intended to affect the use and value of the land and bind
subsequent owners and those that were intended to be personal to the covenanting parties only.24
The court then rejected a narrow approach to determining whether the use and value of land were
benefitted by a noncompetition covenant. The appropriate benchmark was not the size of the
burdened property relative to the market area, but rather the lessening of competition in the
market area.25 Furthermore, this benchmark was but one of many factors to consider in
evaluating the reasonableness of the covenant. 26

22 Id. at 296. For a discussion of Virginia's approach to employment noncompetition covenants, see
the article by Robert Billingsley, which appears next in the Fee Simple.
23 Strangely, the court neglected to mention the touch and concern test when listing the reasonableness
factors. This omission could be interpreted as evidence that the court did in fact abandon the touch and
concern test, despite the court's assertion to the contrary. More likely, however, the touch and concern
element is implied in one of the flrst two factors listed by the court ("intention[s] of the parties" and
"considerations exchanged"). See FRANZESE, supra note 17, at 251.
7A

Davidson, 579 A.2d at 296.

2S

Id. at 297.
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Factors listed by the court in Davidson include:
1. The intention of the parties when the covenant was executed, and
whether the parties had a viable purpose which did not at the time
interfere with existing commercial laws, such as antitrust laws, or public
policy. 2. Whether the covenant had an impact on the considerations
exchanged when the covenant was originally executed. This may provide
.a measure of the value to the parties of the covenant at the time. 3.
Whether the covenant clearly and expressly sets forth the restrictions. 4.
Whether the covenant was .in writing, recorded, and if so, whether the
subsequent grantee had actual notice of the covenant. 5. Whether the
covenant is reasonable concerning area, time or duration. Covenants that
extend for perpetuity or beyond the terms of a lease may often be
unreasonable. 6. Whether the covenant imposes an unreasonable
restraint on trade or secures a monopoly for the covenantor. This may
be the case in areas where there is limited space available to conduct
certain business activities and a covenant not to compete burdens all or
most available locales to prevent them from competing in such an
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The court in Davidson was clearly attempting to free the policies behind the touch and
concern requirement from the technical rules that governed application of the requirement.
Although numerous commentators have posited opinions on the proper interpretation of the touch
and concern test, rT one of the most sensible statements of the test focuses on the reasonable
expectations of the ordinary purchaser.28 This analysis asks whether the reasonable layman
would expect the promise to be personal, tied up with the land, or both.29 Any analytical tool,
including the complicated reasonableness formula posited by the court in Davidson--which
successfully realizes the policy goals underlying the touch and concern test while pulling back
the mysterious shroud of the touch and concern test-serves a valuable function in defining why
some sort of limitation on restrictive covenants is necessary. Analysis which is directed at
effectuation of the policy goals of the traditional touch and concern test, whether it be the
ordinary purchaser test or a complicated reasonableness formula, applies equally well in the
equitable servitudes context as in the real covenant area.
Virginia's courts have steadfastly resisted the use of real covenant law in evaluating the
enforceability of noncompetition covenants against subsequent purchasers. The only case in the
recent past which has even mentioned the requirements of a real covenant while evaluating a
noncompetition agreement was Net Realty Holding Trust v. Franconia Properties, inc.,30 a
federal case applying Virginia state law. Simply stated, noncompetition covenants are generally
valid when reasonable and are enforceable in equity against subsequent purchasers with notice
of the agreement when the parties intended the agreement to bind successors in title. Both
benefits and burdens of noncompetition covenants may pass to subsequent purchasers with notice
when the intent requirement is satisfied.31 Virginia law today has taken an important step
towards a principled reconciliation of the competing policies implicated by noncompetition
covenants. The importance of allowing free alienability of land while still respecting the ability
of private parties to meaningfully contract regarding the future use of land is recognized by
Virginia law, which focuses clearly on the intent of the contracting parties, the fairness of

activity. 7. Whether the covenant interferes with the public interest. 8.
Whether, even if the covenant was reasonable at the time it was executed,
"changed circumstances" now make the covenant unreasonable.
Id. at 295.
Z7 See, e.g., CHARLEs a...AR.K, REAL COVENANTS AND OTIIER INTEREsrs WI-DCH RUN Wrrn TIlE l..AND
(2d ed. 1947); Bigelow, The Content of Covenants. in Leases, 12 MICH. L REV. 639 (1914).

1I.See Lawrence Berger, A Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting the Use of Land, 55 MINN. L REV.
167 (1970).
29

Id. at 211.

30

544 F. Supp. 759 (E.D. Va. 1982).

31

Hercules Powder Co. v. Continental Can Co., 196 Va. 935 (1955).
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enforcement by and against subsequent purchasers, and the protection of the public interest. The
next step for the Virginia courts is to consider the possibility of making a clean break with the
past and focusing directly on the public policy considerations of enforcing noncompetition
agreements against subsequent purchasers--perhaps even without regard for the original parties'
intent.32

321be draft Restatement (Third) of Property makes significant breaks with traditional servitudes law
in at least two instances. First, the Restatement combines easements, profits, real covenants, equitable
servitudes, and irrevocable licenses into the primary category of servitudes. The draft presents servitude
law as an integrated body of rules and principles. The drafters explain that, except in a few instances, "all
the servitude devices are functionally similar." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERlY (SERvrnJDES)
introduction at xxiii (Tentative Draft No.1, 1989). Second, the Restatement proposes the elimination of
the horizontal privity of estate requirement and the touch and concern requirement from servitudes law.
Id. § 2.4.; id. § 3.2 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1991).
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